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FEDERAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEEDINGS-UNITED STATES ACCEPTANCE 
OF INTERNATIONAL CoURT OF JUSTICE COMPULSORY JurusDICTION-In October 
1957 Switzerland, on behalf of the holding company now commonly known 
as Interhandel,1 addressed an application against the United States to the 
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). Claiming I.C.J. jurisdiction by 
reason of the United States adherence to article 36 (2) of the Statute of the 
Court,2 Switzerland's submissions were essentially that the United States 
was under an obligation (I) to restore to Interhandel assets of the General 
Aniline and Film Corp.s which had been seized in 1942 pursuant to the 
Trading with the Enemy Act,4 and, as an alternative, (2) to submit the 
1 Originally called I. G. Chemie, now Societe Internationale Pour Participations Indus-
trielles et Commerciales S.A. (hereafter referred to as Societe Internationale), "Interhandel" 
is entered in the common registry of the Canton of Basie, Switzerland. Societe Internation-
ale v. McGranery, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 435. 
2 Art. 36 (2) provides: "The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation 
to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal 
disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international 
law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation." For the United States adherence, see Declaration 
of the United States of America of August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598. 
3 GAF, a Delaware corporation, was founded in 1939 as American I.C. Chemical Corp. 
by merger of Agfa-Ansco Corp., General Aniline Works, and Ozalid Corp. In general see 
Buttler, "General Aniline Nears the Block," N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 1956, p. 29:1. From 
its inception GAF was almost wholly owned by Interhandel. Mason, "The General Aniline 
and Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF nm AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 
at 114-117 (1958). 
4 The act provides for the vesting of title to enemy owned assets in the Alien Property 
Custodian. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended by the Fust War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 
839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §5 (b). 
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dispufe to arbitration.5 The United States countered with four prelimi-
nary objections to jurisdiction.6 Most important were objections 3, that 
" ... Interhandel ... has not exhausted the local remedies available to it 
in the United States courts," and 4 (a), that the "sale or disposition [ of 
GAF assets] has been determined by the United States of America, pursuant 
to paragraph (b) of the Conditions attached to this country's acceptance 
of this Court's jurisdiction [the automatic reservation],7 to be a matter 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of this country." By order of 
October 24, 1957, the court rejected, for lack of urgency, Switzerland's 
request to indicate interim measures.8 On March 21, 1959, the court 
rendered judgment on the preliminary objections. By a nine-judge ma-
jority, held, the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust local 
remedies. Ten judges found it unnecessary to adjudicate upon objection 
4 (a), observing that the objection was made only with regard to disposition 
of the vested assets, and that the United States had not yet determined to 
make such disposition. Interhandel Case (Preliminary), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6. 
On October 21, 1948, Interhandel filed an action in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia9 seeking restoration of its vested assets on the 
ground that at the time of seizure it was not an enemy or ally of an enemy. 
Although a Swiss company, Interhandel apparently had been formed by 
I. G. Farben, a German chemical trust.10 The crux of the dispute was 
whether German ownership terminated prior to the United States' declara-
tion of war upon Germany in 1941. In the district court the parties moved 
for discovery.11 On July 5, 1949, Interhandel was ordered to produce the 
bank records of H. Sturzenegger & Cie.12 On June 15, 1950, two weeks 
before the St1:rzenegger records were to be produced, the Swiss Federal 
5 Principal case at 19. 
6 Id. at 10-11. 
7 "PROVIDED, that this declaration shall not apply to .•. (b) Disputes with regard to 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of 
America as determined by the United States of America .•.. " Declaration of the United 
States of America of August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598. 
s Interhandel Case (Interim), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 105. 
9 As provided for by the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended 
by the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) §9 (a). 
10 E.g., Interhandel's first president, Hermann Schmitz, also first president of American 
I.G. Chemical Corp., was chairman of the Board of I. G. Farben. Interhandel's original 
stock was issued on behalf of Ed. Greutert &: Cie., predecessor of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie., 
a private Swiss banking concern purportedly financed by I. G. Farben. Mason, "The Gen-
eral Aniline and Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SocmrY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LA.w 114 at 115 (1958). 
11 Pursuant to Rule 34, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958). 
12 Societe Internationale v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 263. I. G. Farben is said 
to have controlled Interhandel, by a system of options, pledges and loans, through the 
so-called "Sturzenegger Circle." In 1940 the control system was at least nominally termi-
nated. Whether effective control was relinquished probably cannot be discovered without 
examination of the records of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie. Mason, "The General Aniline and 
Film Co. Case," PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 at 116 
(1958). "The inference is plain that an investigation of I. G. Chemie is necessarily an 
investigation of H. Sturzenegger &: Cie." Societe Internationale v. McGranery, note 1 supra, 
at 441. 
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Attorney constructively seized them through the exercise of a preventive 
police power, considering that submission would constitute violation of 
article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law13 and article 273 of the Swiss Penal 
Code.H The court then appointed a special master, who found, inter 
alia, that Interhandel had made a good faith effort to obtain the ordered 
documents, that there was no evidence of collusion between plaintiff and 
the Swiss Government, and that "there was a substantial legal basis for the 
seizure under Swiss law."15 The court itself, after adopting the master's 
report, found "that the ... papers were and are in the possession . . . of 
plaintiff and that except for their confiscation ... plaintiff would be able 
to produce them."16 However, considering that to hold otherwise "would 
permit a foreign party to be placed in a favored position by the laws or 
action of his government,"17 the court then held that plaintiff "refused"18 
to comply with a production order, and that dismissal with prejudice was 
proper.19 After considerable delay the court of appeals made a final af-
firmance.20 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,21 
holding that because of "serious constitutional questions" of due process, 
dismissal was inappropriate.22 The case was remanded with instructions 
to require additional evidence of good faith, "explore plans looking to-
wards fuller compliance," or proceed to trial on the merits. 
Switzerland's application to the I.C.J. was based upon the U.S.-Swiss 
Washington Accord.23 That agreement provided that Switzerland would 
liquidate German assets within her jurisdiction. The Swiss Compensation 
Office was charged with liquidation, and its decisions were subject to appeal 
by an Allied Joint Commission to the Swiss Review Authority. The Ac-
cord also stipulated that "the United States will unblock Swiss assets in the 
United States."24 In February 1946 the Swiss Compensation Office de-
termined that Interhandel was a Swiss company.25 The Joint Commission 
indicated disagreement. On January 5, 1948, the Review Authority an-
13 The provision provides for banking secrecy. 
14 This article creates the crime of "economic espionage." 
15 Societe Internationale v. McGranery, note I supra, at 439. 
16 Id. at 442. 
11 Id. at 443. 
1s Within Rule 37 (b) (iii), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958). 
19 By reason of Rule 34, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958). 
20 The district court suspended operation of its dismissal for three months. Societe 
Internationale v. McGranery, note 1 supra, at 445. The court of appeals affirmed, but 
allowed six more months of grace. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 
225 F. (2d) 532. In August 1956, the district court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate 
dismissal, and the court of appeals reaffirmed at 243 F. (2d) 254 (1957). 
21 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
22 "Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because 
of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established 
that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not willfulness, bad faith, or any fault 
of petitioner." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, id. at 212. 
23 Of May 25, 1946. For text see 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946). 
24 Art. IV (1), U.S.-Swiss Washington Accord, 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946). 
25 The remainder of this paragraph is based upon the principal case at 17-19. 
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nulled blocking of Interhandel's Swiss assets, which had been provisionally 
blocked since 1945. In a note of May 4, 1948, to the State Department, 
Switzerland contended that her Review Authority's decision made the 
question of the nationality of Interhandel's ownership res judicata, by 
reason of the Accord, vis-a-vis the United States. The Department of State 
reply of July 26, 1948, rejected this thesis. Switzerland persisted, and in 
her note of September 7, 1948, requested arbitration under article VI of 
the Accord.26 On October 12, 1948, the United States suggested that her 
courts were open to non-enemy aliens seeking restitution of vested assets. 
Correspondence was suspended until April 9, 1953, when Switzerland com-
plained that litigation had reached a deadlock. Various notes were then 
exchanged, culminating in the Swiss note of August 9, 1956, which again 
proposed arbitration under the Washington Accord, or under the Arbitra-
tion Treaty of February 16, 1931.27 The United States rejected these pro-
posals on January 11, 1957. In a memorandum appended to the United 
States note the State Department recognized Switzerland's exhaustion of 
local remedies, although the United States Supreme Court subsequently 
granted certiorari.2s 
On two important occasions, the instant case and the Case of Certain 
Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway ),29 the I.C.J. has had before it a 
party whose acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was subject to an 
automatic reservation. In both cases the majority of the court, prompted 
perhaps by a notion of expediency,s0 found it unnecessary to adjudicate 
the validity of the reservation. Six permanent judges, however, have dis-
agreed, and specifically addressed themselves to the subject.31 Five of the 
six find the reservation invalid for three basic reasons: (1) inconsistency 
with article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute of the Court,32 because the 
reserving state purportedly retains the right to "settle" particular jurisdic-
26 "In case differences of opinion arise with regard to the application or interpretation 
of this Accord which cannot be settled in any other way, recourse shall be had to arbitra-
tion." U.S.-Swiss Washington Accord, 14 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 1121-1124 (1946). 
27 47 Stat. 1983 (1931), T.S. 844 (1931). 
28 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, note 21 supra. 
29 [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9. The French Declaration, reserving "differences relating to 
matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Govern-
ment of the French Republic," was withdrawn on July IO, 1959. For English text of the 
new French Declaration, see ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, RE-
PORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING ASPEGr OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION REsERVA-
TION 80 (August 1959). 
30 See suggestion by Boskey, PROC. CORNELL SECOND SUMMER CoNF. OF INT. LAw 33 
(1958) that such practice is not unusual, citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 at 
448 (1929). 
31Armond-Ugon (Uruguay), principal case at 90; Guerrero (El Salvador, died 1958), 
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 43; Klaestad (Norway), principal case 
at 75; Lauterpacht (United Kingdom), Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29 supra, 
at 43, principal case at 95; Sir Percy Spender (Australia), principal case at 54. Judge Read 
(Canada, term expired 1958) found the French reservation involved a good-faith determi-
nation and hence was not automatic. Case of Certain Nonvegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 94. 
32 "6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter 
shall be settled by the decision of the Court." 
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tional disputes by its own decision, (2) fundamental inconsistency with the 
article 36 (2) concept of jurisdiction "compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement,"33 and (3) failure of the acceptance, including the 
reservation, to constitute a legal obligation because the existence and ex-
tent of the obligation is dependent upon ad hoc unilateral determination by 
the accepting government.34 One judge has attacked the validity of these 
propositions on the basis of an implied requirement of good faith in in-
vocation of automatic reservations, which would make them subject to 
judicial review,3° but he seems clearly wrong insofar as the intent of the 
United States Senate is concerned.36 The major difficulty, if any, seems 
to be the relation between these reasons and a conclusion that the United 
States' reservation is invalid. Although the United States' condition (b) 
may be somewhat different from a reservation to an ordinary multilateral 
treaty, it is clearly analogous. Based on the theory that a state cannot be 
bound without its consent, according to the traditional view, a ratification 
with reservation of a multilateral treaty is inoperative unless all parties to 
the treaty accept such reservation.37 Hence, the first of the above reasons 
for invalidity has some precedent in international law. According to a 
relatively recent position taken by the I.C.J., however, ratification with a 
reservation which is compatible with the raison d'etre of the treaty may, 
in some circumstances, be operative without subsequent universal consent.38 
The second reason for invalidity would take automatic reservations to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the court out of any such special class. The last 
reason is founded upon a conceptualistic notion of legal act, roughly analo-
gous to the Anglo-American contract notion of illusory promise. 
33 The text of art. 36 (2) is quoted in note 2 supra. 
34 Lauterpacht bases this objection on a "generally recognized principle of law," pre-
sumably within art. 38 (c) of the Statute of the Court, which authorizes application by 
the court of "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Case of Certain 
Nonvegian Loans, note 29 supra, at 49. 
35 Armond-Ugon, principal case at 93-94. 
36 See statements by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser to the State Department, PRoc. 
CORNELL SECOND Sm.rMER CONF. ON INT. LAw 144-147 (1958); Lauterpacht's historical 
survey in the principal case at 107-111. See also Senator Connally's explanations of the 
condition, which he introduced as an amendment, in 92 CoNG. REc. 10624, 10695 (1946). 
37 See, e.g., statement of Adrian Fisher while Legal Adviser to the State Department, 
Senate Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
Genocide Convention, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 134 (1950); United Kingdom Memorandum 
annexed to the September 20, 1950, Report of the Secretary-General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
No. A/1372 (1950). 
38 ,Vllile accepting the principle of universal consent, the court noted that with 
regard to the Genocide Convention the purpose of the General Assembly and adopting 
states was that "as many States as possible should participate," and concluded that the 
parties had therefore tacitly consented in advance to reservations which did not "frustrate 
or impair, by means of unilateral decisions or particular agreements, the purpose and 
raison d'etre of the convention." Advisory Opinion on Reservations, (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 15, 
45 AM. J. INT. L. 579 (1951). 
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An additional problem may center on the possible separability of ad-
herence and condition (b). One judge,39 with an oblique reference to 
American practice of attempting to institute actions against Communist 
states concerning aerial incidents,4° concluded the United States intended 
to make a valid adherence. Admitting some ambiguity in the American 
position,41 it would seem that the intent of the United States Senate, which 
originated the condition, was to accept compulsory jurisdiction only in 
principle. This is consistent with the established Senate position of 
giving only token acknowledgment to the notion of compulsory interna-
tional adjudication while jealously guarding the prerogatives of the United 
States.42 Nevertheless, it would be expedient, perhaps, for the court to 
continue to avoid decision on this delicate question until absolutely neces-
sary. Because of the condition of reciprocity built into I.C.J. compulsory 
jurisdiction,43 any state against whom the United States attempted to bring 
an action could take advantage of the unfortunate condition (b).44 Hence, 
the conclusion of no jurisdiction could almost always be based on invoca-
tion of the condition, assuming, arguendo, the condition's validity. If 
adherence is not judicially eliminated the repugnant condition may not, 
in particular disputes, be invoked, and the court could possibly find the 
question of validity moot by reason of jurisdiction based on implied consent. 
It would seem that the only possible situation requiring adjudication of the 
validity of the adherence would be an application to set aside a default 
judgment. This seems unlikely. 
One must finally decide whether the United States should withdraw 
the "as determined by the United States" language of condition (b). In 
particular the Senate seems to have been concerned with the possibility of 
an adverse international decision on immigration, tariffs, or the. Panama 
Canal.45 The American Bar Association Section of International and 
Comparative Law has concluded that there is negligible risk of a present 
holding that these areas are not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the United States as determined by international law.40 A non-automatic 
39 Armond-Ugon, principal case at 93-94. 
40 E.g., Case of the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of U.S.A. (U.S. v. Hungary), 
[1954] I.C.J. Rep. 99; Aerial Incident of Oct. 7th, 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 
9; Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S. v. Czechoslovakia), [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 6. In 
each of these cases the court rejected the American action because the defendant had not 
accepted compulsory jurisdiction. 
41 In addition to the aerial cases, note 40 supra, see State of the Union Message, 40 
DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 115 at 118 (1959); Becker, "Some Political Problems of the Legal 
Adviser," 38 DEPT. OF STATE BuL. 832 (1958). 
42 See note 36 supra • 
. 43 See note 2 supra. 
44 This is what happened to France in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, note 29 
supra. 
45 See Senator Connally's remarks, 92 CoNG. REc. 10624 (1946). · 
40 ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND CoMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING 
ASPECT OF THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JUR.ISDICTION RESERVATION 43-44 (August 1959). 
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reservation of domestic jurisdiction, although surplusage,47 would not be 
objectionable. The present reservation, however, detracts from United 
States leadership in advocating a world-wide rule of law. Further, it sub-
stantially detracts from the growth of such a system,48 the alternative to 
which would seem to be either non-settlement of disputes, or settlement by 
force or threat of force. It also leaves the ever-increasing interests abroad 
of both the United States Government and United States nationals subject 
to the risk that a foreign government will, by reciprocal use of the reser-
vation, evade what otherwise would have been an obligation to adjudicate 
a perfectly valid American claim. Of course the problem is difficult: at 
bottom seems to lie the irreconcilability of advocating law while firmly 
resolved to protect, regardless of illegality, what are thought to be vital na-
tional interests. In this regard, aside from the moral question, it might be 
well to observe that the United States already holds the right to veto Security 
Council enforcement of an adverse judgment.40 
Robert Jillson 
47 In the following seven international court decisions the court has recognized its 
lack of jurisdiction over matters exclusively domestic: Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees 
(Advisory Opinion), P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (1923); Treatment of Polish Nationals in 
Danzig (Advisory Opinion), P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932); The Losinger, P.C.I.J., Ser. 
A/B, No. 67 (1936); Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 77 (1939); 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 89; Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 
[1957] I.C.J. Rep. 6; and Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Rumania (First Phase, Advisory Opinion), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 229. In all cases except 
the last, where "essentially" was used, it was asserted that the matters were "exclusively" 
domestic. Based on a study of these cases, Briggs, "The U.S. and the I.C.J.: a Re-Examina-
tion," 53 AM. J. INT. L. 301 at 304-305 (1959), concluded: (I) within this context the court 
finds no significant difference between "exclusively" and "essentially"; (2) whether a 
matter is exclusively within domestic jurisdicion is a question of international law; (3) 
disputes are not exclusively domestic if they "arose out of matters which were governed 
by treaty or other principles of international law and determination of the rights of the 
parties involved an examination of their obligations under international law"; (4) when 
confronted with a plea of domestic jurisdiction the court proceeds to determine its compe-
tence, and (5) if incompetent, refrains from rendering a decision on the merits. 
48 The following states have accepted American leadership in reserving to themselves 
the right to decide whether a particular reservation is applicable to a given dispute: India 
(1956, acceptance of jurisdiction withdrawn 1957), Mexico (1957), France (1949, reserva-
tion withdrawn 1959), Liberia (1952), Union of South Africa (1955), Pakistan (1957), The 
Sudan (1958) and the United Kingdom (1957, reservation withdrawn 1958). ABA SEC-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE SELF-JUDGING AsPECT OF 
THE UNITED STATES' DOMESTIC JURISDICTION REsERVATION 22-23 (August 1959). 
49 "2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under 
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon meas-
ures to be taken to give effect to the judgment." CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Art. 94. 
(Emphasis supplied.) Art. 23 (1) provides that the United States shall be a permanent 
member of the Security Council. Art. 27 (3) provides, inter alia, that on all matters not 
procedural Security Council decisions "shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." (Emphasis supplied.) 
